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tual influence of foreign policy actions between the two actors of international relations. 
My paper draws on the analysis of (a) primary sources, namely official Vatican documents 
(encyclical letters, papal speeches and interviews) and journalistic texts; and (b) hermeneu-
tics offered primarily by IR theorists, historians and the experts on the Vatican, as well as of 
the interviews with two U.S. ambassadors to the Holy See and the statements of President 
Obama during his press conference held in Washington in 2014.
Despite of some past and recent diplomatic controversies and discords, it could 
be expected that the relations of the Holy See and the U.S.A. will develop in the spirit of 
mutual understanding, mainly in the issues of the poor, the marginalized, those without 
opportunity, religious minorities around the world, and growing global inequality. In fact, 
the Vatican has been clear about its position on a range of issues, some of them in which the 
U.S.A. differs (contraception, intentional abortions, same-sex marriages), but most of 
which these states agree on. Nowadays, it is clear that the Holy See does not envision ente-
ring into a partnership or a coalition with any political figure on any issue. Possible immi-
nent threat of war against Iran, Syria, North Korea or another state would probably lead 
the Holy See again to accentuate the diplomatic (i.e. not military) solution of the conflict, 
using all available diplomatic tools and appeals to peacekeeping as was the case in the war 
in Vietnam or both wars in the Gulf. The Holy See would therefore probably attempt again 
to use its soft power by seeking (partial) control of international political rhetoric and dis-
course. Its success in the case of further engagement was probably even smaller than in the 
case of some of its current manifestations such as in international politics. To be sure, it 
would be methodologically flawed to measure the success of the Holy See’s foreign policy 
and diplomacy by empirical criteria common in international relations. ”Vatican” diplomacy 
is specific and it has in many respects a privileged position in the international political 
structure; it is not directly dependent on partial successes or failures but draws form the 
”ethos” of global peace and understanding between peoples. Its mission is in fact based on 
an atypical kind of power that could be called a ”Catholic Christian idealism”, which is 
transcendental and personal at the same time; it motivates through appeals to Providence, 
and to spirituality. It is without any doubt that the Holy See could play a greater role in 
conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction. On the contrary, pragmatic and far-sig-
hted American foreign policy could use it for enhancing its soft power and improving its 
image in the international arena. It is questionable whether the Holy See could accede (con-
sciously) to such a diplomacy game. Rather, we could expect that her own activities of a hu-
manitarian and diplomatic nature would aim at such specific global problems as a long-las-
ting exodus of Christians from the Middle East and protection of endangered Christian 
minorities in general throughout the world.
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1.	Introduction
Formation of a suitable foreign policy towards the Democratic People´s Republic of Ko-
rea1 (North Korea, DPRK) is an often discussed issue. As a majority of negotiations with 
1)  This article originated in the Framework of project “Civil Society organizations and 
Their Role in Confidence Building in Conflict-Prone Areas” (SGS-2013-017) supported by 
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the DPRK are connected with the North Korean nuclear program, it can be perceived as 
a matter of regional and even global security. Within the contemporary diplomatic 
efforts, just a few actors continually have a leading role in the negotiations with the 
DPRK: namely, the United States, the Republic of Korea, China and to some extent Ru-
ssia. The United States surely is a leader as far as the nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy 
towards the DPRK is concerned. Along with the Republic of Korea (South Korea, RoK), it 
also provided extensive but relatively discontinuous humanitarian assistance to North 
Korea, mainly until 2008.2 
In case of the United States, it had long been the economic assistance that 
was supposed to “open the doors” of North Korea and to intimidate it into concessions 
in terms of its nuclear program. Nevertheless, this strategy failed and the USA has gra-
dually been turning to a stricter approach towards the DPRK, which is often called the 
strategic patience doctrine. After a manifold spectrum of strategies implemented so 
far, all the previous negotiations with North Korea more or less oscillating around one 
topic (nuclear program) seemed to end in a blind alley. 
We can observe that the U.S. foreign policy towards the DPRK has been 
changing dynamically over more than two decades after the end of the Cold War. We 
argue that the analysis of the previous foreign policy strategies of the United States and 
the comparison of approaches of its post-Cold War presidents can be helpful for under-
standing the recent position of the DPRK in the international system as it has strongly 
been influenced by its nuclear capacities. The originality of this article lies mainly in 
a new perspective it provides. Certainly, there are several studies of the U.S. policy to-
wards the DPRK. For example, let us mention L. Sigal (Sigal 1998) who provided us with 
the descriptive microanalysis of the U.S. diplomacy, R. Reed (Reed 2006) analyzing the 
U.S. stance towards the North Korean nuclear issue. There are also plenty of studies 
dealing with particular aspects of the U.S. North Korean policy or policy of particular 
administration (for example Chang 2007; Kim 2009 or Ahn 2012 and many others). Ne-
vertheless, the articles dealing with the U.S. North Korean policy in its complexity are 
rather rare and there are no papers analyzing the U.S. foreign policy goals and tools. 
Thus the main contribution of this article is to bring a new perspective on the researched 
issue. The aim of this paper is firstly, to provide analysis of the foreign policy of the Uni-
ted States towards the DPRK from 1990 until nowadays and critically evaluate them. 
Secondly, we aim to apply the foreign policy analysis concept from the point of view of 
the foreign policy goals and tools used for the foreign policy implementation. Last but 
Student Grant Competition at the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen.
2)  For more detailed information about humanitarian and development assistance pro-
vided to the DPRK see AidFlows (non-dated), Manyin and Nikitin (2013) or Kudláčová 
(2014).
not least, we intend to compare the foreign policy goals and tools used by different U.S. 
presidents in a delimited time framework.
The structure will be the following. Firstly, we will introduce the methodolo-
gy used in this paper and explain the reason why we chose the case of foreign policy 
strategies of the United States. Secondly, we will shortly present the conceptual frame-
work of the foreign policy analysis from the perspective of goals and tools. Subsequent-
ly, the very analysis of the U.S. foreign policy towards the DPRK will follow. Last but not 
least, we intend to present the results of the comparison of the foreign policy strategies 
of the analyzed presidential administrations and if present, also particular trends will be 
depicted. We will divide the analysis into time periods according to particular U.S. pre-
sidents in office.3
2.	Methodology	and	conceptual	framework
When we go through the title of this article, the question arises why we have chosen the 
case of the United States for the analysis. As we could see in the introduction, when the 
strategy of open-handed assistance failed and massive assistance of the USA and its 
close allies (mainly of the Republic of Korea) was cut, another actor obtained growing 
relevance in its bilateral relations with the DPRK: China. We could recently observe Ru-
ssian efforts to expand its relations with North Korea too. Nonetheless, as it is very hard 
to acquire any reliable data about the Chinese and Russian relations with the DPRK (in 
case of the Russia-North Korea dyad, mutual relations still remain relatively weak), we 
have chosen the United States as the case that can be analyzed properly. Of course, the 
role of the Republic of Korea in negotiations with the DPRK has also been high. Never-
theless, if we started to deal with South Korean policy, we would definitely have to inclu-
de the reunification issue and the limited extent of this article makes this impossible. 
Another reason why we decided to analyze the U.S. policy is that it would be very diffi-
cult to realize the same analysis based on foreign policy goals and tools (see below) of 
China and Russia simply because the goals and tools of these countries remain to be ei-
ther unclear or based on more or less sophisticated estimates. Conversely, the United 
States issues a relatively extensive amount of documents where it addresses foreign 
policy goals and tools intended to implement. Moreover, the U.S. foreign policy repre-
sentatives have been giving various interviews and speeches that can recently serve us 
as useful source of information. Last but not least, the United States definitely is an ac-
tor who has held a leading role in the negotiations with the DPRK. 
If we should classify this paper from the point of view of the used method, it 
is a comparison of foreign policy strategies of the United States towards the DPRK from 
3)  We decided to use this way of text structuring as the changes in foreign policy course 
often occurred with a change in the presidential office. 
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1990 until the present. The particular aspects or factors where the foreign policy of the 
U.S. post-Cold War presidents will be compared are the foreign policy goals and foreign 
policy tools (for particular delimitation, see below).
As this paper is not supposed to be focused on theory, we definitely do not 
aim to provide a description of the foreign policy analysis as a subfield of international 
relations. Rather, for the purposes of this article, we borrowed just certain parts of this 
extensive subfield of IR, which we perceive as a source of conceptual tools that hope-
fully will help us to achieve both the necessary narrowing and clarification of the re-
search subject. Moreover, this can also contribute to better understanding of the practi-
cal U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding to North Korea. As already mentioned above, 
we focus on foreign policy goals and tools. We operate at the state level of analysis.
At the beginning, to be able to proceed towards a practical analysis of the 
foreign policy of the USA, we need to define foreign policy as such. There is surely 
a broad spectrum of various definitions. Foreign policy can be understood as “A govern-
ment´s policy in dealing with other nations.”4 Christopher Hill defines foreign policy as the 
“[…] sum of official foreign (outer) relations managed by an independent actor (usually by 
a state) in international relations” (Hill 2000, 992). When we go through those definiti-
ons, a question will occur where is the foreign policy heading to and how the particular 
direction is taken into practice. This is the question of particular foreign policy goals and 
foreign policy tools. 
If we add the aspect of goals to the above mentioned definition, we can say 
foreign policy is oriented towards fulfillment of certain delimited (national) interests 
(goals, priorities) of states. The foreign policy goals can be further understood as an 
“[…] intersection of the desirable and possible in an effort of the state” (Drulák and Drulá-
ková 2007, 21) or simply as a certain foreign policy course of the state while taking into 
consideration the actual political conditions and opportunities. When it comes to fore-
ign policy tools, they can be understood as instruments used flexibly for the implemen-
tation of foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, as also Druláková and Drulák point out, it is 
not always possible to clearly distinguish goals and tools: the boundary between those 
two notions is relatively permeable. Consequently, classification always depends on the 
specific situation (Drulák and Druláková 2007, 33). The particular subdivisions of both 
foreign policy goals and tools can be seen at Chart 1 and Chart 2. For the purpose of our 
analysis, we adopted the mechanism of goals and tools structuring and also of delimita-
tion of particular subdivisions of goals and tools from Drulák and Druláková 2007 (as 
outlined in Chapter 2 and 3). 
4)  Oxford Dictionaries: Definition of foreign policy in English, http://www.oxforddictio-
naries.com/definition/english/foreign-policy, 21. 6. 2014.
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Chart	1: Foreign Policy Goals
Source: made by author according to Drulák and Druláková (2007, Chapter 2)
Chart	2:	Foreign Policy Tools
Source: made by author according to Drulák and Druláková (2007, Chapter 3)
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The advantages of implementing this conceptual framework are the fo-
llowing: (1) it represents a model that helps us to focus on the practical outcomes and 
ideas of foreign policy without the danger of getting entangled into the complex proce-
ss of foreign policy formation where various intra-state actors are involved; (2) focusing 
on goals and tools forms a feasible base for comparison: we gain criteria or indicators, in 
which we are able to compare foreign policy in a chosen time period; (3) it enables us to 
organize this complex topic relatively clearly; (4) it enables us to approach the depicted 
topic in a different manner than other papers do which can itself bring us new perspecti-
ve to U.S. approach towards the DPRK.
Conversely, the main disadvantages are that (1) the boundary line between 
the goals and tools is relatively vague; (2) neither this conceptual framework is able to 
uncover possible hidden intentions of political elites of both states. Nevertheless, we 
argue that the second mentioned disadvantage would be difficult to overcome by any 
other conceptual framework. As we are aware of both disadvantages and advantages of 
our conceptual framework, we will try to balance the drawbacks as much as possible.
3.	Analysis	of	the	US	Foreign	Policy	towards	North	Korea
3.1.	Period	of	1990–1993:	Some	Carrots,	Many	Sticks?
This initial period of the U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsu-
la5 was determined by several factors. Namely, we can mention the heritage of the 
Cold War division of the world, which brought deep distrust, former negative experien-
ce of the United States with the North Korean military provocations and various North 
Korean attacks on the U.S. and South Korean military personnel.6 Furthermore, North 
Korea was constantly suspicious of the U.S. motives towards the DPRK (Olsen 2009, 
139), which actually persist even until nowadays. Nevertheless, the administration of 
the then president George H. W. Bush acted to some extent consistently with the 
South Korean “nordpolitik” of that time, which can be shortly described as a broader 
effort to warm and ameliorate relations with the DPRK (see below). In 1990, after the 
5)  The opening of the U.S. – North Korean diplomatic relations can be dated by the first 
mutual meeting in Beijing in 1988 which was the last year of Reagan´s administration. 
Nevertheless, those contacts were not a vital issue of the U.S. foreign policy of that time 
(Sigal 1998, 25). 
6)  Namely, we can mention the capturing of the Pueblo ship in 1968 by North Korea or 
the attack on two U.S. soldiers in the DMZ. Mutual distrust was deepened by the DPR-
K´s attacks on South Korean officials in 1983 and South Korean civil aircraft in 1987 (Li-
brary of Congress 1993a: Library of Congress Country Studies. North Korean Foreign 
Policy. The United States. Federal Research Division: Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.
loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+kp0120%29, 14. 6. 2014).
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joint U.S. – South Korea meeting, the U.S. spokesman said that “The United States rea-
ffirms that it is not a threat to North Korean security, and we seek to improve relations with 
that country” (quoted according to Fitzwater in Oberdorfer 1990). 
Nevertheless, even in the very early 1990s, the reality of both the emerging 
North Korean nuclear program and presence of the U.S. nuclear weapons on the South 
Korean territory was perceived as an obstacle to settle the mutual relations (comp. Sig-
al 1997). This reality contributed to the U.S. decision to remove its strategic arms of the 
Peninsula: in 1991, the administration of George H. W. Bush announced the withdrawal 
of nuclear weapons allocated in South Korea and it also quietly supported the North-
-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of December 
1991. By that time, even the DPRK seemed to be willing to abide by its commitments 
arising from its signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Reed 2006, 107–108).7 
To sum up, the North Korean policy of President Bush can be described as 
a strategy of “carrots and sticks” whereas initially, the United States offered security 
assurances but later, it chose a harder stance and refused to offer further inducements 
to the DPRK (Sigal 1998, 38). Foreign policy goals declared by the United States in this 
period were as follows: It was seeking to warm up mutual relations8 and to integrate the 
DPRK into the international community. To achieve these goals, the United Stated me-
diated cultural or academic exchanges with North Korea,9 eased trade restrictions on 
the U.S. companies as far as trade with the DPRK was concerned and supported the 
admission of the DPRK into the United Nations structures.10 Furthermore, it arranged 
mutual negotiations concerning replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement by 
a peace treaty, which could consequently mean the final withdrawal of U.S. troops 
(Kwak 2009, 121). 
7)  North Korea became the NPT signatory in 1985. 
8)  The “warming up” of the relations is closely connected with a long-term U.S. effort to 
normalize mutual relations. This U.S. foreign policy goal formed in the early 1990s has 
not been accomplished although some moments in the researched period seemed to be 
more promising in this regard (see below). 
9)  It is necessary to point out that those exchanges were naturally not implemented at 
the governmental level – they have always been a matter of non-governmental interac-
tions often financially supported by the U.S. government (Lee and Shin 2011, 11). The 
origins of the U.S. official support of those track-two exchanges can be found in the so 
called “modest initiative” negotiated during the U.S.-North Korean meeting in 1988 in 
Beijing (Sigal 1998, 25). 
10)  Library of Congress (1993a): Library of Congress Country Studies. North Korean Fo-
reign Policy. The United States. Federal Research Division: Library of Congress, http://
lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+kp0120%29, 14. 6. 2014.
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Another and an even more important U.S. goal was to resolve the emerging 
question of the North Korean nuclear program. The crucial tools employed to achieve 
this goal were security assurances to the DPRK (Sigal 1998, 25). In particular, it was the 
above mentioned withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from the Peninsula, cancellation of 
the joint military exercises with South Korea (Team Spirit) of 1992 and there was also 
a meeting of the U.S. (Arnold Kanter) and North Korean (Kim Yong-sun) representati-
ves. The main topic of their discussion was the nuclear-free North Korea.11 As Sigal 
(1998, 37) points out, this mutual U.S.-North Korean meeting in New York showed the 
North Korean readiness to negotiate.
What were the North Korean reactions to this U.S. effort? It would be preca-
rious to say that the efforts of the United States and its allies (mainly South Korea) to 
warm up relations had a direct effect on the then reciprocal actions of the North.12 Ne-
vertheless, in 1991, the DPRK became a member of the United Nations, and also signed 
and in April 1992 ratified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
agreement. The latter was perceived as an important step forward as it enabled the 
IAEA inspectors to visit North Korean nuclear facilities.13 Moderation of the prior North 
Korean harsh rhetoric towards the United States can be to some extent perceived as the 
outcome of the U.S. implementation of the “modest initiative” commenced by Presi-
dent Reagan (Sigal 1998, 25; Wit 2001). Nevertheless, substantial change in the directi-
on of the U.S. policy towards the DPRK at the end of the Bush administration14 probably 
contributed to a rapid worsening of mutual relations and to a lowering of the North Ko-
rean willingness to abide by the NPT and IAEA commitments.
11)  Center for Non-Proliferation Studies: North Korean Nuclear Developments: An Up-
dated Chronology 1992. North Korea Special Collection, Monterey Institute of Internati-
onal Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/index.htm, 18. 6. 2014.
12)  We can only estimate to which extent the DPRK really reacted on the U.S. and South 
Korean open-minded policy: at the same time, North Korean behavior could have been 
a result of its characteristic strategy of brinkmanship, desire for the Western industrial 
equipment and technologies (Library of Congress 1993b: Library of Congress Country 
Studies. North Korea. Foreign Economic Relations. Federal Research Division: Library of 
Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+-
kp0092%29, 14. 6. 2014) and of the North Korean experience with the disintegration of 
the Eastern bloc and of its own fear of the same destiny. 
13)  IAEA: In Focus: IAEA and DPRK. Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards,http://
www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml, 28. 6. 2014.
14)  In the final years of the Bush presidency, the United States adopted a much less respon-
sive approach as it refused to offer to North Korea more inducements for limiting its nuclear 
program (Sigal 1998, 49) which contributed to a dramatic worsening of mutual relations.
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3.2.	Period	of	1993–2001:	Plenty	of	Carrots,	Just	a	Few	Sticks?
In the first half of 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT and declared 
that it held a special status in the non-proliferation regime. In the light of these circum-
stances, the incoming Clinton administration felt the need to immediately act and kin-
dle the North Korean nuclear ambitions again.15 The main goal of the U.S. foreign policy 
towards the North Korea from the earlier years, i.e. a nuclear-free peninsula, remained 
the same but the tools used for its implementation partially changed: they actually mo-
ved closer to the initial years of the G. H. W. Bush administration (see below).
Besides the nuclear non-proliferation, another matter of interest of the Uni-
ted States was the threat of the North Korean ballistic missiles program and the DPR-
K´s tendencies to export its missile technologies (comp. Harnish 2002, 861). Furthermo-
re, the United States tried to persuade China to exert pressure on the DPRK, mainly in 
the form of economic sanctions (Sigal 1998, 58), which is a tool that still forms a signifi-
cant part of the recent U.S. policy, despite the fact that it has brought virtually none or 
only limited results so far (comp. Nanto and Manyin 2010, 6; Tiezzi 2014). 
Being aware of its blackmailing potential acquired by its nuclear program, 
the DPRK quickly adapted to the quid-pro-quo strategy and started to place its de-
mands, which had to be fulfilled if it were to remain a NPT signatory (comp. Berry 1995, 
10).16 In reaction to the growing tensions, both the United States and the DPRK agreed 
to meet and discuss the disputed issues. Two-round bilateral negotiations were held in 
June and July 1993. The DPRK eventually decided to annul its withdrawal from the NPT 
and to consider the IAEA inspections again (Niksch 2003, 9; Sigal 1998, 69). The United 
States promised to provide security assurances to North Korea and also expressed its 
intention to help North Korea to negotiate the possibility to obtain light water reactors 
(LWR) (Berry 1995, 12). Nevertheless, in spite of those partial compromises, the DPRK 
remained very cautious and its assurances of non-proliferation often remained vague. 
Moreover, neither the United States was willing to undertake the first step, which finally 
led to a deadlock. 
15)  It is also necessary to point out that the DPRK certainly was not one of the top prio-
rities of the U.S. foreign policy of Clinton´s era and the DPRK thus stayed somehow over-
shadowed by other U.S. priorities. For instance, in the first half of the 1990s, it had to 
deal with the Gulf War, participated at the disastrous UN peacekeeping mission in Soma-
lia and was involved in other thawing conflicts of the early post-Cold War era.
16)  According to a chief negotiator with the DPRK in the Clinton era, Robert Gallucci, 
Pyongyang wanted the assurance that the United States will not endanger their security 
(The Frontline 2003: Interview: Robert Gallucci, March 5, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gallucci.htm, 15. 6. 2014).
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In January 1994, in the “Annual Report to the President and Congress”, the 
U.S. counter proliferation strategy acquired clearer contours and was to affect the U.S. 
policy towards North Korea as well. The main principles of the strategy were preventi-
on, protection and cooperative threat reduction (U.S. Secretary of Defense 1994, 38–
43). The tools that were supposed to stop (not only) North Korean nuclear proliferation 
were for example strengthening of regional security alliances, trade sanctions, reinfor-
cement of the NPT regime or export-control of materials, which could be used for 
WMD17 producion (U.S. Secretary of Defense 1994, 37–38). We can see that the 
“sticks” were preferred in this strategy. However, in practice, the Clinton administrati-
on rather implemented a “talk loudly and carry big carrot” (quoted according to Kraut-
hammer in Sigal 1998) strategy. Therefore, the U.S. approach of the first half of the 
1990s was somehow puzzled and inconsistent as it contained both aspects of direct 
engagement and pressure/containment (comp. Feffer 1999). This inconsistency and 
ambiguity of the U.S. policy towards North Korea actually mingles with the following 
administrations as well.
When the DPRK refused to allow the IAEA inspections to enter in May 1994, 
the Clinton administration intended to put forward economic sanctions at the UN Secu-
rity Council. This decision would be in compliance with the counter proliferation strate-
gy of January 1994 but never materialized. Niksch (2003, 9) argues that it was the threat 
of sanctions that led Kim Jong-Il to propose a return to high-level negotiations with the 
United States. Finally, the subsequent high-level meetings gave birth to the signature of 
the bilateral Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in October 
1994. Agreed Framework was observed as a breakthrough as the DPRK declared it 
would fully give up its nuclear program in exchange for the U.S. construction of two 
LWR18 in the DPRK and regular U.S. heavy fuel oil shipments. The Korean Energy Deve-
lopment Organizations (KEDO) was subsequently established as a platform that was 
supposed to support the implementation of the goals declared in the Agreed Frame-
work.19 Agreed Framework can be perceived as a U.S. foreign policy tool aimed at nor-
malizing mutual relations, making the DPRK give up its nuclear program and also as an 
example of direct engagement (together with the discussions about canceling the Team 
Spirit exercises).20 By that time, the Clinton administration seemed to have finally cho-
sen the path of engagement.
17)  Weapons of Mass Destruction.
18)  Light Water Reactors.
19)  KEDO: About Us: Our History. Korea Energy Development Organization, http://
www.kedo.org/au_history.asp, 25. 6. 2014.
20)  In the United States, there was a strong disunity between the incumbent Demo-
crats preferring engagement and concessions and the Republicans who were accusing 
Analysis	of	the	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	towards	North	Korea	|	Lenka	Kudláčová
To sum up, the foreign policy tools used by the early Clinton administration 
towards North Korea were mostly diplomatic ones. The initiation of the Four Party 
Talks21 in June 1997 was an important segment of Clinton´s strategy. Four Party Talks 
also represented the first base for multilateral nuclear negotiations with the DPRK ever 
and it was also supposed to contribute to a greater trust all over the Korean Peninsula 
(Albright 1997). In comparison with the former Bush administration, Clinton actually 
did not recourse to particular security assurances for the DPRK. Later in the 1990s and 
at the beginning of the 2000s, there was also a significant amount of the U.S. food aid 
and fuel shipments provided practically without any monitoring regime. Those aid ship-
ments can be perceived as an important tool of the U.S. foreign policy that was suppo-
sed to engage the DPRK and to support its willingness to denuclearize.22 Clinton´s wi-
llingness to provide the DPRK with assistance was neither shaken by the 1998 revelation 
that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons nor by the subsequent North Ko-
rean test-firing of a medium range missile Taepodong-1 (Cho 2009). The era when mu-
tual relations were intensified culminated in October 2000 when a meeting of Clinton 
and Kim Jong-Il (U.S.-DPRK) was followed by releasing a Joint Communiqué. Both par-
ties declared their effort to intensify mutual relations and to work towards strengthe-
ning mutual trust (comp. U.S. Department of State 2000).
However, in the following years, implementation of the enactments of the Co-
mmuniqué and of the Agreed Framework turned out to be highly problematic. The fre-
quent delays in heavy fuel oil shipments by the U.S. and the DPRK s´ unwillingness to obey 
the IAEA regulations deepened mutual distrust. Moreover, Washington refused to lift the 
past economic sanctions, which was in direct contradiction to the declared effort to inte-
grate the DPRK into the international community. The U.S. foreign policy tools were 
mostly based on mere promises (although this is often claimed just about the DPRK) or 
partial or delayed implementation of the promised etc. Furthermore, the approval to ne-
gotiate with the DPRK at the high level was perceived by the U.S. foreign policy represen-
tatives as a reward (comp. Sigal 1998, 83), which is somehow a distorted opinion. 
The main achievement of this era was that the DPRK returned to the NPT 
structures and signed the Berlin Agreement suspending further missile testing in ex-
change for partial removing of the U.S. economic sanctions (Harnisch 2002, 862). 
the Democrats of weakness and unproductive appeasement (comp. Sigal 1998, 81; 
DiMuccio and Kang 1998).
21)  Four Party Talks, the predecessor of the Six Party Talks, were a multilateral forum for 
negotiations between the USA, DPRK, RoK and China. The main goal of this forum was 
to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. 
22)  For more information about the politicization of the U.S. aid for North Korea, see 
Kudláčová (2014, passim). 
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Nevertheless, the revelation of the fact that the DPRK still develops its nuclear pro-
gram despite the NPT commitments showed that the impact of the above mentioned 
achievements was rather limited. The main problems were the following. Firstly, there 
were significant discrepancies in Clinton´s policy towards the DPRK and also the tools 
used were often contradictory, although we can say the second half of Clinton´s term 
(mainly after 1995) was more consistent in terms of its support of direct engagement 
and willingness to negotiate with the DPRK. Nevertheless, very often, the U.S. and 
North Korean understanding of mutual agreements differed greatly, which also led to 
various misinterpretations (Pollack 2011, 118). Secondly, huge mutual distrust be-
tween the United States and North Korea was still present, which actually brought 
about various difficulties. Both parties remained reluctant to proceed with fulfilling 
their former agreements as they thought it would significantly weaken their negoti-
ating position.
3.3.	Period	of	2001–2009:	Foreign	Policy	Reversal
As it was mentioned above, the Clinton administration faced a strong criticism from the 
Republicans who argued Clinton´s approach is a mere appeasement comparable to the 
strategy of the United Kingdom in the 1930s. The newly elected president Bush soon23 
followed the path those critics proposed: containment-like strategy and using deterren-
ce rather than former engagement (Quinones 2003, 198). In particular, the feature typi-
cal for Bush was that DPRK-U.S. negotiations should serve as a reward for the DPR-
K´s obedience in terms of the non-proliferation regime (comp. O´Hanlon 2003). We could 
actually perceive this logic of “negotiations-as-reward” even during the Clinton´s early 
years but Bush was pushing for it in a much more consistent way. The same logic was 
used when providing assistance: aid was no longer supposed to be provided as an incen-
tive to make North Korea abide by the rules of nuclear proliferation. It could only be pro-
vided after (not before) particular North Korean concessions mainly regarding its disar-
mament and nuclear concessions. Furthermore, the proponents of this hawkish policy 
preferred the so called “anticipatory breach” strategy meaning that if it was obvious that 
one participant at the negotiations does not intend to fulfill the terms agreed, the second 
party does not have to comply with it either. Although this approach can be understan-
dable with regards to numerous delays in the implementation of the Agreed Framework 
23)  In the initial years, despite his proclamation that his approach would be different 
from the one of Clinton, Bush mostly followed Clinton´s path. However, after the 9/11 
attacks there appeared a significant shift in the U.S. foreign policy tools applied to North 
Korea (comp. Quinones 2003, 197). This later strategy of Bush is often described as the 
ABC (Anything But Clinton) policy (Matray 2013, 144).
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(which had not been the result of the DPRK´s activities only, though), it further deepened 
mutual distrust.
As we can see, the then U.S. diplomacy towards the DPRK gained a highly 
confrontational tone.24 According to Harnisch (2002, 864), it was for the first time the 
United States declared it had been prepared for a possibility of a preemptive strike 
against the DPRK, although in official documents of the U.S. Congress, Chanlett-Avery 
and Rinehart argue that “[…] there is no publicly available evidence that any U.S. admini-
stration since 1994 has seriously considered direct military strike” against North Korea 
(Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, 3). In general, we can say that the North Korean 
policy of President Bush moved closer to the strategic patience doctrine, which favored 
threatening gestures instead of offering inducements. Once again, this naturally led to 
cutting down aid flows for the DPRK (Armacost, Okimoto and Shin 2003, 6).
After the 9/11 attacks, the hawkish foreign policy of the Bush administration 
towards North Korea (now perceived as a rogue regime and part of the Axis of Evil) was 
implemented to the full scale. The Bush administration definitely terminated the “sun-
shine” period25 and diverted from the path of joint U.S.-South Korean engagement 
efforts (comp. Sigal 2003; Armacost, Okimoto and Shin 2003, 2). Thus, mainly since the 
very end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, the foreign policy tools used for implemen-
tation of goals changed and the issue of resolving the DPRK´s nuclear program obtained 
even a higher priority26 (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, 14). 
In the light of the changing Bush´s strategy, the Agreed Framework collap-
sed at the end of 2002 or at the beginning of 2003, respectively. The North Korea decla-
red its withdrawal from the NPT and restarted its plutonium-based nuclear program 
24)  Besides the fact that in 2002, Bush labeled the DPRK as part of the Axis of Evil and 
that in his speech, he said he “loathes Kim Jong-il” (The Progressive: Bush´s Messiah 
Complex, May 2003, http://www.progressive.org/feb03/comm0203.html, 29. 6. 2014).
), the U.S. Secretary of State Powell argued that Kim Jong-il is a dictator (Harnisch 2002, 
864). The Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld went so far as to declare that North Korean le-
aders are “idiotic” (Hwang 2004, 15). In a framework of “missionary policy” Bush wanted 
the U.S. to be perceived as a messiah or liberator of oppressed all over the world. Even his 
rhetoric towards the North Korea was compatible with this perception of the world order.
25)  Sunshine policy or engagement policy is a term used for the South Korean policy to-
wards DPRK in the period of 1998–2008. It can be characterized by overall détente of 
inter-Korean relations and more specifically, by the intensification of mutual economic 
relations.
26)  This increased emphasis relates to the whole international security situation after 
the 9/11 attacks. The character of North Korean regime poses the threat of transferring 
nuclear weapon components to other countries (Straub 2012, 4).
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(Pollack 2011, 131). Yet again, it is difficult to say if this was the result of Bush´s confron-
tational approach to North Korea or the result of the North Korean awareness of its own 
blackmailing potential brought by the nuclear program. Nevertheless, the situation was 
not dissimilar to the early 1990s, which gave the final voice to Bush´s opponents.27 He 
was mainly criticized by the proponents of engagement who argued that he quickly de-
stroyed each diplomatic success that Clinton had reached. In his speeches, Bush highli-
ghted repeatedly he did not trust North Korean promises and he openly denounced 
South Korean engagement policy (Hwang 2004, 15). 
Growing tensions between the USA and the DPRK, critical voices from inside 
the U.S. political and scientific circles combined with the second nuclear crisis and 
a restart of the North Korean nuclear program were a matter of serious concerns that 
claimed a solution. The then endeavor of the USA and its allies to arrange an agreement 
with North Korea finally resulted in the initiation of the Six Party Talks (SPT) in August 
2003. SPT, the successor of Four Party Talks, was a multilateral forum where six states 
(USA, RoK, China, Russia, Japan and DPRK) discussed the conditions for North Korean 
denuclearization. SPT are often perceived as an expression of change of Bush´s appro-
ach as far as the willingness to negotiate with the DPRK is concerned (Bajoria and Xu 
2013). In 2005, after several rounds of negotiations, the DPRK agreed to abandon its 
nuclear program again in exchange for food aid and fuel shipments. Nevertheless, this 
step was never taken into practice.28 From the U.S. point of view, we can see SPT as 
another tool that was supposed to help to proceed with the DPRK´s denuclearization.
Besides the omnipresent issue of nuclear program, there was one emer-
ging and let us say, highly ambitious goal of the U.S. policy towards North Korea du-
ring that era, which was solving the issue of North Korean human rights. The prece-
ding administrations of G. H. W. Bush and B. Clinton kept omitting this striking 
problem from the negotiating agenda mainly for two reasons. Firstly, any reliable in-
formation about the actual human rights situation in the DPRK practically did not 
exist until the end of the 1990s. Secondly, even if there were any reports about the 
27)  For example, Clemens argued that “[…] Bush administration did what it could to poison 
the atmosphere and sabotage the prospect of an accommodation with North Korea” 
(quoted according to Clemens in Matray 2013, 144). 
28)  In the same year, it turned out that the DPRK is laundering money in the Banco Delta 
Asia in Macao. Consequently, the United States placed severe trade restrictions on this 
bank, which induced a negative North Korean reaction in form of the 2006 underground 
nuclear explosion and missile test (Bajoria and Xu 2013). It is necessary to stress that the 
scenario of intimidating North Korea – North Korean negative reaction – missile launch/
nuclear test – international condemnation repeated over and over again starting practi-
cally since the era of President Bush.
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violation of human rights, it was not in compliance with the engagement policy to re-
proach North Korea for abusing human rights. 
To sum up, in the North Korean policy of the Bush administration, we can 
identify two basic goals and one additional: the first one is the ultimate and practically 
unconditional denuclearization of North Korea. The second is also connected with the 
DPRK´s military capacities: the USA sought to stop the DPRK´s efforts to develop balli-
stic missile systems. Furthermore, there emerged new U.S. tendencies to object to the 
North Korean violation of human rights. Nevertheless, this issue did not become a ma-
tter of genuine political action (except for the case of the North Korean Human Rights 
Act /NKHRA/29 signing in 2004, which has nevertheless brought a few results so far). The 
astringent human rights rhetoric of President Bush was unsustainable also due to the 
strong opposition mainly from South Korea. South Korean leadership still preferred en-
gagement and a modest approach to North Korea arguing repeatedly that it was not 
possible to arrange any agreement with the DPRK and criticize its human rights records 
at the same time (Hwang 2011, 3). Thus, as also Chanlett-Avery (2008, 2) points out, it 
was unclear how the issue of North Korean human rights should become a matter of the 
U.S. political agenda. Consequently, human rights agenda was deprioritized.30 
What were the tools the USA used for the implementation of those goals? As 
the previous text indicates, Bush chose a relatively radical departure from his predeces-
sor. He issued threats of preemptive strike aimed at the regime change. Furthermore, he 
focused on economic sanctions and cutting of the food and fuel assistance. Bush practi-
cally refused to hold any bilateral talks with North Korea until the termination of the 
North Korean nuclear program. He also preferred multilateral coordination of the nego-
tiations with his allies in Northeast Asia (Quinones 2003, 199), which became clearly visi-
ble in the form of initiation of the Six Party Talks. Another important diplomatic tool in-
troduced by the Bush administration was the so called Proliferation Security Initiative 
29)  The NKHRA is focused mainly on the human rights of North Korean refugees both in 
the USA and the world (comp. U.S. Congress 2008). In the framework of NKHRA, the 
position of the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea was established in 2004. 
According to the U.S. Department of State, his role is to “[…] coordinate and promote 
efforts to improve respect for the fundamental human rights of the people of North Ko-
rea” (U.S. Department of State: Office of the Special Envoy for Human Right is North 
Korea, http://www.state.gov/s/senk/, 10. 6. 2014). The Special Envoy is supposed to re-
port on human rights conditions and also to cooperate with NGOs working in this area.
30)  In 2008, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the State Christopher Hill in charge of the Six 
Party Talks pointed out to the issue of human rights being part of the Six Party Talks: 
“Are you trying to get something accomplished, or are you just trying to feel good?” 
(quoted according to Hill in Hwang 2011, 3).
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(PSI) in 2003. Within PSI, the United States intended to form a group of allies which 
should “[…] block North Korea´s use of the international markets to bolster its weapons of 
mass destruction strategic agenda” (Olsen 2009, 144–145).
To conclude, during the era of Bush´s presidency, the conflict between North 
Korea and the U.S. obviously deepened. The dominant feature of the Bush´s cautious 
“sticks-preferring” approach was the willingness to impose various trade sanctions and 
open and sharpen criticism of the North Korean regime. If there were any negotiations 
with the DPRK, they proceeded at the multilateral level, which was a significant change 
compared to the era of G. H. W. Bush and B. Clinton (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, 
4). This confrontational practice naturally induced a negative reaction by the North Ko-
rean leaders who started to be even less willing to give up their nuclear ambitions. This 
actually became more evident after the North Korean repeated withdrawal from the 
NPT in 2003, by the termination of the Agreed Framework/Korean Energy Develop-
ment Organization (KEDO) in 2006.31 Relatively unsuccessful developments of SPT ne-
gotiations further confirmed this trend32 (comp. Kim 2009, passim). Thus, if there were 
any seeds of trust planted during the years of Clinton´s presidency, they gradually di-
sappeared during the Bush era.
3.4.	Since	2009	until	the	present:	Dull	North	Korean	Policy?
After the hawkish era of the North Korean policy written by the Bush administration, 
many expected a more moderate approach from his successor. Those expectations 
were supported also by the electoral debates where Obama declared that the strategy 
of “[…] not talking to people […] has not worked” (Obama quoted according to Straub 
2012, 5) neither with Iran, nor with North Korea. In his inaugural speech, Obama confir-
med that he was willing to negotiate with rogue regimes and also declared that he 
would avoid the harsh rhetoric, which was typical for his predecessor (Quinones 2009, 
2). In March 2009, the U.S. Ambassador for the DPRK Stephen Bosworth argued that 
the USA would like to quickly resume the SPT (Quinones 2009, 5). Nevertheless, so far, 
there has not been any significant easing of U.S. pressure on the North Korea, and we 
can say that Obama mostly followed the strategic patience doctrine of the previous era 
31)  KEDO: About Us: Our History. Korea Energy Development Organization, http://
www.kedo.org/au_history.asp, 25. 6. 2014.
32)  The negotiations within SPT experienced plenty of ups and downs. In general, in all 
rounds, North Korea promised certain concessions, while in exchange, the USA promised 
aid and easing of sanctions. Nevertheless, Pyongyang usually failed to implement the con-
cessions to the full scale, which led the U.S. to refuse to give North Korea what it had pro-
mised (comp. Bajoria and Xu 2013 or Park 2005, passim). This vicious cycle, North Korean 
nuclear tests and internal discrepancies finally resulted in the freezing of the SPT in 2009.
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(Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, 4). The absence of comprehensive mutual negoti-
ations persists until nowadays and there has not been virtually any progress in terms of 
North Korean denuclearization: Washington still argues that although the mutual dialo-
gue is necessary to resolve the nuclear issue, the first steps still depend on Pyongyang 
(comp. Davies 2013). Sadly, this meant practically no change in comparison with the 
previous administrations.
The recent deadlock is caused by many factors. First, in 2008, the conserva-
tive president Lee Myung-bak who chose to leave the “sunshine” way of the previous 
South Korean presidents took office. Second, in April 2009, North Korea launched ano-
ther long-range missile and a nuclear test followed (comp. Kim, Sahay, Kane and Reif 
2013). This was obviously a difficult environment for the United States to propose the 
restoration of engagement. Instead, the USA and their allies proposed new UN Security 
Council sanctions against the DPRK, which stirred up Pyongyang to declare the end of 
SPT negotiations (Straub 2012, 6).
Thus, when Obama entered office in January 2009, although initially propo-
sing a possibility to engage North Korea, he inherited a failing SPT and highly tangled 
relations with the DPRK.33 Even recently, Obama´s administration continues to support 
imposing sanctions as he perceives them as “[…] a tool to impede the development of 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and proliferation-related exports, as well as to 
make clear the costs of North Korea’s defiance of its international obligations” (Obama 
quoted according to Russel 2014). However, as we could observe, sanctions do not seem 
to have achieved the desired effect so far.
While emphasizing sanctions, the Obama administration also stresses the 
importance of Chinese cooperation as far as the implementation of the UN resolutions is 
concerned. This is surely not a new aspect of the U.S. policy towards North Korea but 
Obama´s administration sees it as the essential aspect of a successful North Korean poli-
cy (comp. Snyder and Byun 2009, 14) and Obama stresses it even more than his predece-
ssors.34 As far as the joint negotiations with the DPRK are concerned, probably the most 
33)  Not only the general provocations and those taken against the USA have to be taken 
into consideration. In 2010, North Korea attacked the South Korean corvette Cheonan. 
Moreover, a few weeks later, it attacked South Korean artillery in the West Sea (Straub 
2012, 8). With regard to the close U.S.-RoK relations, this attack was perceived very ne-
gatively by the USA, too.
34)  The main argument of those who support Chinese pressure on North Korea regarding 
the nuclear issue is the following. China represents an emerging power and consequent-
ly, it is supposed to fulfill its obligations as the good international citizen. Although China 
expressed its concerns and disagreement with the North Korean nuclear program, it has 
repeatedly been unwilling to proceed to particular steps (such as reducing its economic 
support of Pyongyang) that would be in compliance with the approach of the USA and its 
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important stage started in 2011 and finally resulted in the so called Leap Day Agreement 
(LDA) of February 2012. The main axis of the LDA was North Korean denuclearization in 
exchange for U.S. aid and increased cultural interactions. Nonetheless, the LDA lasted 
just two months: it became void when the DPRK launched a long-range missile (Chan-
lett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, 6). This almost immediate failure of the LDA led to serious 
skepticism of the Obama administration regarding the possibility to engage with North 
Korea. The Secretary of State H. Clinton argued that Obama´s administration does not 
intend to lure North Korea to the negotiating table with any rewards and that the nego-
tiations are only possible if Pyongyang itself steps on the way of “[…] full and verifiable 
denuclearization” (Clinton quoted according to Straub 2012, 7). As a result, the United 
States during the era of President Obama chose to wait until the DPRK makes the first 
steps. Only then possible U.S. “carrots” can follow. 
As the previous text indicates, this let us say “waiting for a miracle appro-
ach” has often been criticized. Opponents usually argue that the impasse of the United 
States (and of its allies) will only open space for development of the North Korean 
nuclear program and for possible nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, critics propose 
that the United States should ease its demands the DPRK would have to meet even be-
fore the negotiations start (Boswoth and Gallucci 2013). So far, the U.S. policy regar-
ding North Korea seems to be rather dull and vague in practice. Some go as far as to 
claim that the Obama administration has virtually no North Korean policy (Straub 
2012). Nevertheless, as also David Straub (2012, 14) argues, Obama has a very limited 
maneuvering space in this respect. 
Another issue attracting increasingly more attention has been the grave hu-
man rights situation in the DPRK. George W. Bush was the first president who started 
explicitly speaking about North Korean human rights abuses. Later, the Obama admini-
stration argued that it would support and closely cooperate with non-governmental or-
ganizations, which try to ameliorate human rights conditions. Furthermore, it declared it 
would cooperate with allied governments and finally that it was going to further support 
free radio broadcasting for North Korea (Straub 2012, 7). This actually means little or no 
change compared with Bush. Once again, the human rights issue is not really a primary 
U.S. goal in North Korea. Of course, the human rights incantation is often present in 
speeches of the U.S. representatives dealing with North Korea.35 Nevertheless, when it 
allies. The main reason why China acts this way is that it is afraid of North Korea collap-
sing, which would probably cause massive influx of North Korean refugees.
35)  Comp. King 2012 or The White House: Press Conference with President Obama and 
President Park of the Republic of Korea, (April 25, 2014, Blue House, Seoul, Republic of 
Korea), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/press-conference-pre-
sident-obama-and-president-park-republic-korea, 21. 6. 2014. The gravity of the human 
rights problem in North Korea has been underlined even since the inception of the Com-
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comes to the practical policy, except for the Special Envoy for North Korean Human 
Rights, there are no straightforward steps aimed at amelioration of the human rights 
situation in the DPRK. This argument is also supported by the recent content of the 
Department of State website that is supposed to release reports and statements of 
the Special Envoy: it is very schematic (comp. U.S. Department of State, non-dated).36 
To sum up, the goals of the Obama administration remained basically the 
same as those of Bush. The primary goal of the U.S. policy towards North Korea has 
been to denuclearize North Korea and to prevent it from development of its missile 
programs. Additionally, the United States repeatedly condemned the North Korean 
human rights violation but in practice, there have been only limited deeds in this re-
spect. Rather, this remains to be a certain ideal, which virtually cannot be accom-
plished without the regime collapsing. Compared to the Bush´s goals in North Korea, 
Obama never explicitly claimed he aimed to actually remove the existing North Kore-
an regime. However, after the second nuclear test of the DPRK, Obama argued that 
“[…] the United States has no hostile intent towards the people of North Korea, nor are 
we threatening to change the North Korean regime through force” (Obama quoted 
according to Quinnones 2009, 6). 
As far as the foreign policy tools used by the Obama administration are 
concerned, there is a relative continuity with the Bush administration as the United 
States very often resorted to imposing sanctions. Naturally, this has to be seen in con-
text of the growing number of the North Korean military provocations that materiali-
zed during Obama´s presidency so far. Moreover, with slight exceptions, we could 
observe a dramatic decline in terms of diplomatic contacts. Recently, the active diplo-
macy with North Korea does not seem to be a primary tool of the U.S. used to achieve 
its goals. To conclude, Obama´s policy towards North Korea seems to be dull: it can be 
characterized by plentiful notions of the dreadful human rights situation in the DPRK, 
dangerous nuclear program and strong U.S. efforts to deal with those issues. Ho-
wever, when coming to practical policy, we can see little or no deeds at all. In this re-
gard, the United States nod in agreement together with South Korea after its new 
President Park entered office in 2013. Park also likes to speak about “trustpolitik” but 
she is rather inactive in her practical policy.
mission of Inquiry on Human Rights in DPRK (comp. OHCHR: Commission of Inquiry on 
Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, http://www.ohchr.org/en/
hrbodies/hrc/coidprk/pages/commissioninquiryonhrindprk.aspx, 20. 6. 2014).
36)  Since 2009, this position is held by Robert R. King.
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4.	Summary	of	the	Comparison
In this paper, we tried to critically analyze and compare strategies of the U.S. post-Cold 
War presidents towards North Korea. We could observe interesting reversals: from a sli-
ghtly confused engagement across proactive containment towards the dull policy of 
President Obama. We can say that the U.S. foreign policy goals remained the same to 
a large extent in the whole researched period. Chart No. 3 shows the outputs of the 
comparison of foreign policy goals and tools of particular presidential administrations 
of the United States.
The be-all and end-all goal of the U.S. foreign policy towards the DPRK has 
been nuclear-free Korean Peninsula: this is an issue all analyzed presidents actually agre-
ed on. This is understandable mainly when the U.S. interests on the stability of Northe-
ast Asia is taken into consideration: North Korea armed with nuclear weapons would di-
vert the regional balance of power to a significant degree. Another important and 
omnipresent goal of all of the analyzed administrations is the elimination of North Kore-
an long-range missiles. Since the second term of George W. Bush, we could perceive new 
emphasis on the North Korean human rights abuses. Nevertheless, as we demonstrated 
above, this goal rather remains on the level of political ideals and it has only been little 
reflected in practical policies. This is valid for G. W. Bush and B. Obama as well.
To be clear, in the whole researched time period, the United States has had 
predominantly power goals in North Korea (i.e. DPRK free of nuclear and long range balli-
stic missiles, normalization of mutual relations) whereas economic ones absented in all 
the administrations. Ideational goals appeared to some extent in era of G. H. W. Bush and 
B. Clinton (inclusion of the DPRK into the international community, liberalization of North 
Korean economy). Nevertheless, during the G. W. Bush era, the human rights claims occu-
rred for the first time. Furthermore, as we could also perceive, the most ambitious foreign 
policy goals can be found in the Bush administration. Bush was the only president who 
spoke about removing the North Korean regime and he also did not hesitate to use very 
sharp rhetoric on behalf of the DPRK. Since 2008, Obama has been choosing a more mo-
derate approach towards the DPRK and mainly after the failure of the LDA, we can ob-
serve a certain resignation on further negotiations with North Korean representatives. It 
seems to us that no U.S. foreign policy goal in North Korea was accomplished. Neverthe-
less, often criticized Clinton administration that chose engagement as a strategy probably 
made the most important step on the way towards normalization of mutual relations.
As far as the foreign policy tools are concerned, the United States has been 
oscillating between two poles, namely engagement and containment. All administra-
tions obviously favored diplomatic tools whereas G. H. W. Bush and B. Clinton prefe-
rred bilateral high-level talks37 and G.W. Bush and B. Obama favored rather seldom 
37)  With the exception of Four Party Talks initiated by Clinton.
multilateral negotiations. As far as the military tools are concerned, they were used 
very rarely by all of the analyzed administrations. In particular, G. H. W. Bush decided 
to cancel the U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises Team Spirit, B. Clinton worked 
towards strengthening the regional security alliance. This could not have been done 
properly in case of G. W. Bush as his North Korean policy was contradictory to the 
South Korean one. Finally, B. Obama employs joint large-scale military exercises with 
RoK to deter North Korea. 
The economic tools have been used practically by all of the researched ad-
ministrations (see Chart No. 3). Clinton preferred mainly economic incentives in form of 
extensive aid and fuel shipments. Conversely, hawkish G. W. Bush and also a bit more 
moderate Obama strongly sided to the policy of economic sanctions. It is highly debat-
able if either aid or sanctions are able to persuade the DPRK to give up its nuclear pro-
gram. Nevertheless, I would rather agree with the voluntary human rights worker Mr. 
Sang-hung Kim who argued that sunshine policy had positive impact and that North 
Korea is no longer the same as it used to be after the sunshine policy implementation 
(Kim 2013). Also a former negotiator with the DPRK R. Gallucci stated that “[…] you can 
talk to North Koreans. It is not that you can trust the North Koreans. It is that you can talk 
to them, and you can get certain benefits out of a negotiation”.38 On the contrary, we can 
hardly observe those “certain benefits” after imposing sanctions. 
It is also interesting to observe how little the United States supported cultur-
al and people-to-people contact on lower level so far (and also implementation of ideo-
logical/cultural tools). I argue this is a method that proved to be efficient on the level of 
the U.S. or European NGOs working in North Korea. Perhaps, it would be fruitful if the 
U.S. representatives expressed broader support for those contacts. The other incom-
prehension of all of the researched U.S. administrations has been the fact that they have 
perceived negotiations with North Korea as an award the United States is giving to 
North Korea. For North Korean representatives, this naturally evokes the feeling that 
the USA does not see the DPRK as an equal partner leading to further distrust and en-
couraging North Korea to keep their nuclear program going. The same can be said about 
the approach of waiting for the first step of the DPRK.
To conclude, the main difficulty negatively influencing mutual negotiations 
is the fact that mutual relations still remain locked in the Cold War biases. This actually 
hinders any significant progress in mutual negotiations. Furthermore, the primary U.S. 
goal i.e. to denuclearize the Peninsula is in fact in contradiction with the survival of the 
North Korean regime as the nuclear program has always been the primary goal of North 
Korean representatives. I suppose we should realize that the DPRK probably perceives 
38)  The Frontline 2003: Interview: Robert Gallucci, March 5, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gallucci.htm,15. 6. 2014).
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its nuclear program as the only “trump card” it holds within the international communi-
ty. As the DPRK itself argues “[…] nuclear arms are a treasured sword that it will never give 
up”.39 Thus, to ask North Korea to denuclearize immediately is like to ask it to give up 
everything what it has left. If we should shortly evaluate the fruitfulness of whole re-
searched period in terms of North Korean receptivity to the U.S. policy, the era of en-
gagement brought the DPRK to the negotiating table and various agreements were also 
reached. On the other hand, the hawkish containment policy brought virtually no con-
cessions from the North Korean counterpart. 
5.	Conclusion	
After going through this analysis, one could conclude that it is pointless to negotiate 
with North Korea as there have been only limited results of the talks that already took 
place between the United States and North Korea. This argument is further supported 
by the fact that since the first half of the 1990s, the DPRK constantly continues to argue 
that its nuclear weapons are both a matter of its internal affairs and the reaction on the 
U.S. hostile policy. It understands pressure on its denuclearization as an unacceptable 
intervention in its national sovereignty.40 
Nevertheless, maybe the main problem is the fact that the United States 
and its allies deliberately have been choosing unrealistic goals and they are not willing to 
accept the DPRK as an equal partner for negotiations. Of course, the reality of harsh 
human rights situation in the DPRK hinders the “Western” world to accept negotiations 
with such a rogue regime. However, if we either ignore North Korea or impose sanctions 
on it, we will definitely not help the North Korean oppressed. 
The method we implemented here enabled us to approach depicted topic in 
a different manner than other papers did. It also brought us new perspective to U.S. 
policy towards the DPRK, i.e. the comparison of the practical outputs of the U.S. presi-
dents. Now, let us evaluate both the main directions of the U.S. North Korean policy: 
engagement and containment.
Policy of engagement has been criticized as it has not brought much outcome 
compared to significant costs. On the other hand, sanctions are free of charge. Never-
theless, how could sanctions work if there are actors (such as China) who disrespect 
them? The time proved that it has been virtually impossible to make China act in compli-
ance with the restrictions that international community imposes on North Korea. 
39)  Reuters: North Korea Won’t Give Up Nuclear Weapons, Pyongyang Says, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/20/north-korea-nuclear-weapons_n_3121427.
html?view=print&comm_ref=false, 1. 7. 2014.
40)  Compare Berry 1995; Park 2001, 538 or KCNA: Illegal UNSC’s “Resolution” Does Not 
Work on DPRK: KCNA Commentary, http://kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm, 5. 6. 2014.
Unfortunately, the same can be said about the cooperation at negotiation table. As we 
could perceive in case of the SPT, the level of consensus between the parties negoti-
ating with North Korea has been too low. Maybe a question that arises in here is whe-
ther there is some feasible way for the U.S. how to approach North Korea. However, 
should not we rather ask whether the U.S. truly wants any progress in negotiations? Is it 
possible that the U.S. is satisfied with the status quo on the Peninsula which in fact hin-
ders creation of stronger, unified and nuclear Korea?
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Resume
Tento článek se zaměřuje na zahraničně-politické strategie prezidentů Spojených států 
amerických vůči Severní Koreji po roce 1990. V této analýze zahraničně-politických po-
stupů prezidentů G. H. W. Bushe, B. Clintona, G. W. Bushe a B. Obamy jsme využili kon-
cept zahraničně politických cílů (mocenských, ekonomických a ideových) a nástrojů (di-
plomatických, vojenských, kulturně-ideových, ekonomických), který jsme převzali 
z publikace Drulák a Druláková 2007. 
Administrativa prvního zkoumaného prezidenta G. H. W. Bushe (v úřadu mezi 
léty 1989-1993) se zaměřila především na denuklearizaci Korejského poloostrova a také na 
normalizaci severokorejsko-amerických vztahů. Pokud jde o zahraničně-politické nástroje 
využívané k implementaci cílů, Bush poskytoval Severní Koreji zejména bezpečnostní zá-
ruky (např. zrušil společná vojenská cvičení Team Spirit s Jižní Koreou v roce 1992) a repre-
zentanti americké zahraniční politiky rovněž zprostředkovávali kulturní výměnné progra-
my s KLDR. V době působení druhého zkoumaného prezidenta B. Clintona (1993–2001) se 
velmi silně projevila snaha o navazování intenzivních kontaktů a vztahů se Severní Koreou 
(ačkoliv existovaly jisté odchylky od tohoto zahraničně-politického kurzu). Jádrem Clinto-
novy politiky, jejímž cílem byla denuklearizace KLDR, bylo především poskytování silných 
ekonomických stimulů ve formě pomoci. Clintonova administrativa rovněž preferovala 
častá bilaterální jednání. Další zkoumaná administrativa prezidenta G. W. Bushe (2001-
2008) se radikálně odklonila od strategie svých předchůdců. Zvolila „jestřábí“ postupy 
typu zadržování KLDR, drastického omezení pomoci apod. Vedle již tradičního dlouhodo-
bého cíle, tj. denuklearizace Severní Koreje, se G. W. Bush stal prvním prezidentem USA, 
který se zaměřil na otázku porušování lidských práv v KLDR. Poslední zkoumaný prezident 
B. Obama (ve funkci od r. 2009) zdědil disfunkční a neustále se zhoršující vztahy s KLDR 
a s ohledem na zintenzivnění severokorejských vojenských provokací mu zbylo jen relativ-
ně málo manévrovacího prostoru. Obamova administrativa tak převážně pokračovala 
v Bushově přístupu založeném na uvalování sankcí, ačkoliv se zdá, že Obamova rétorika 
vůči KLDR je umírněnější než Bushova.
Výsledkem této komparativní analýzy bylo zjištění, že americké zahraničně-po-
litické cíle vůči KLDR se v průběhu zkoumaného období měnily jen velmi málo. Naopak ná-
stroje zahraniční politiky se podléhaly poměrně dynamickým změnám. Po celé zkoumané 
období severokorejsko-americké vztahy trpěly nejen nedostatkem vzájemné důvěry, ale 
i poněkud arogantním postojem USA. Spojené státy, které opakovaně zdůrazňovaly nut-
nost dodržování vzájemných úmluv a dohod, samy své části dohod často nedodržovaly. 
Ačkoliv je tento rezervovaný postoj USA vůči KLDR částečně pochopitelný s ohledem na 
samotný charakter severokorejského režimu a jeho opakované provokace, je nutné podotk-
nout, že přispěl k aktuální patové situaci.
